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The introduction of new analytic methods and expansion of research into previously untapped regions have greatly increased the scale and
resolution of data relevant to the origins of agriculture (OA). As a result, the recognition of varied historical pathways to agriculture and the
continuum of management strategies have complicated the search for general explanations for the transition to food production. In this
environment, higher-level theoretical frameworks are sometimes rejected on the grounds that they force conclusions that are incompatible
with real-world variability. Some of those who take this position argue instead that OA should be explained in terms of local and historically
contingent factors.This retreat from theory in favor of particularism is based on the faulty beliefs that complex phenomena such as agricultural
origins demand equally complex explanations and that explanation is possible in the absence of theoretically based assumptions. The same
scholars who are suspicious of generalization are reluctant to embrace evolutionary approaches to human behavior on the grounds that they
are ahistorical, overly simplistic, and dismissive of agency and intent.We argue that these criticisms are misplaced and explain why a coherent
theory of human behavior that acknowledges its evolutionary history is essential to advancing understanding of OA. Continued progress
depends on the integration of human behavior and culture into the emerging synthesis of evolutionary developmental biology that informs
contemporary research into plant and animal domestication.
evolutionary theory | behavioral ecology
Over the last decade there has been a major
expansion of knowledge regarding the timing
and socioecological context of plant domesti-
cation and emerging agricultural systems.
This wealth of data is due in large part to
methodological innovations (e.g., in genetics
and paleogenomics, in the analysis of plant
micro- and macroremains and biological res-
idues, and in the physical and biogeochemical
analyses of anthropogenic sediments), reex-
cavations of some important archaeological
sites, and the expansion of archaeological re-
search into regions whose record of agricul-
tural origins has been until recently poorly
known [such as New Guinea (1, 2), lowland
areas of Mesoamerica and northern South
America (3–7), and northern and southern
China (8–13)]. These research activities have
enriched both the scale and resolution of the
data relevant to agricultural origins world-
wide. One result of this welcome enhance-
ment of the empirical record is wider
acknowledgment of the variability in the his-
torical pathways taken by emerging food pro-
duction systems across space and time. The
dichotomy between foraging and food pro-
duction has been discarded in favor of a con-
tinuum of landscape, plant, and animal
management strategies that sometimes resist
classification. However, for some scholars (2,
14), the richly detailed records of change
seem to have dampened the appeal of general
explanations for the transition to agriculture.
This trend, coupled with the critical stance
toward hypothetico-deductive science cur-
rently influential in archaeological thought
(15), has motivated many archaeologists to
favor interpretive modes of explanation. In
origins of agriculture (OA) research, one
result of this changing climate has been a
proliferation of historical narratives that
highlight local events and processes and
downplay general principles. Although we
recognize the value of empirical rigor, we
argue that the progress of OA research is
significantly hampered by the denial of
explanations derived from a systematic
program of theoretically driven hypothesis
testing. We also reject assertions that evo-
lutionary theory is teleological, needlessly
reductionist, ahistorical, and therefore irrel-
evant to understanding human behavior.
Without a coherent theory of human behav-
ior, arguments about agricultural origins
must rely on assumptions that are often in-
tuitive, unstated, and largely implicit. Cou-
pled with the increasing emphasis on
human exceptionalism, the erosion of scien-
tific method is troubling because it creates
a rift between researchers in biology and ar-
chaeology whose collaboration is essential to
advancing understanding of OA. To address
these weaknesses, we contend that evolution-
ary theory (broadly construed to include cul-
tural as well as biological processes) must
play a central role in OA research.
In arguing for the systematic use of theory
as a tool for the advancement of knowledge,
we are not making the claim that evolution-
ary theory is the only possible realm from
which to choose. However, neo-Darwinism
has withstood repeated challenges to its core
elements, having earned status as an over-
arching framework for explaining the di-
versity of life. For this reason, evolutionary
theory is central to understanding the root
causes of human behavior and indeed culture
itself (16). An even stronger case for the evo-
lutionary perspective on human behavior can
be made now that the distinctive features of
cultural transmission and evolution are be-
coming more fully incorporated into the syn-
thesis (e.g., refs. 17–20).
We divide our discussion of these issues
into three sections. The first elaborates upon
some of the weaknesses of particularism in
OA research. Next, we sharpen the focus
to respond to critiques of evolutionary
approaches to human behavior [particularly
the research program of human behavioral
ecology (HBE) and one of its tools, optimal
foraging theory (OFT)]. We argue that recent
calls to abandon HBE or OFT are misguided,
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and we explain why the particularist alter-
natives might provide more explanatory
depth and power when situated within
a program of behavioral ecology. Finally,
we assess the prospects for a synthetic
evolutionary research program for the
study of domestication and agriculture.
Limitations of Particularism in OA
Research and the Need for Theory
The research trend that we critique in this
paper shares several characteristics with the
approach labeled historical particularism by
historians of anthropology (21). Most closely
associated with Franz Boas and his students,
historical particularism emphasized the col-
lection and compilation of ethnographic data
without the distorting effects of theory. Boas
and his adherents, weary of unsubstantiated
theorizing unsupported by rigorous field-
work, viewed theory as an obstacle to scien-
tific investigation. Generalizations about
culture were suspect because exceptions to
them could always be found. Any reliable
generalizations would be derived inductively
from large bodies of data. Similar recom-
mendations and concerns have been voiced
in the OA literature (14, 22–24), with the
important difference that current expressions
of particularism, rather than disavowing the-
ory, embed it in arguments without explicit
acknowledgment or relegate it to a minor role
that prioritizes empirically based inference.
We argue that the retreat from theory and
the embrace of particularism are not only
unwarranted but also counterproductive.
Particularistic approaches that reject gener-
alization fail to treat inductive inferences as
hypotheses to be tested and substitute appeals
to agency for a consistent theory of human
behavior. These strategies are problematic for
reasons we detail below.
Particularistic Approaches Reject Gen-
eral Principles in the Mistaken Belief
That They Imply Universal Causes and
Ignore History. In the current climate, it is
not surprising that some OA researchers call
for a more particularistic approach to un-
derstanding why human groups became in-
volved in plant cultivation and animal
husbandry. Among the reasons given for
rejecting generalizations about causality is
that contradictory cases can be answered
only by adding qualifiers (ref. 2, p. S380).
Some investigators conflate universal ex-
planations (i.e., “prime movers” like envi-
ronmental change, population pressure, or
divine inspiration), which imply that all
transitions to agriculture conform to the
same causal sequence, with the principles
and assumptions of HBE, which do not
(23). The result is a rejection of both uni-
versal causation and general principles in
favor of “frameworks of explanation that
pay close and careful attention to existing
relevant archaeological information, that
are scaled at the regional level, and that
focus on the complex interplay of a range of
different environmental and social pre-
conditions, prompts, and factors of various
kinds” (ref. 23, p. 681).
We agree that no single cause explains all
instances of transition from foraging to food
production (25–27); this observation is true
but trivial. An explanation that claims uni-
versal validity loses its universality when
exceptions are found to exist. However, its
remaining components—variables, processes,
and assumptions— often remain relevant at
a more modest level of generality. The fatal
flaw in the prime mover arguments is not
that they rely on overarching laws or
assumptions, but rather that they are ap-
plied at an inappropriate scale. Following
the same logic, the optimization assumptions
used heuristically in many HBE models
should not be confused with a claim that
economic optimization explains all tran-
sitions to agriculture (ref. 23, p. 682).
We agree that multiple broad-scale and
local factors are involved in any agricultural
transition (25, 26). However, this is a com-
monsense observation about the world, not
a template for explanation (ref. 23, p. 681). In
fact, complex phenomena such as OA must
be simplified to be understood. A theoretical
framework is needed to guide this process to
ensure that explanations are not fashioned
from a hodgepodge of factors and variables
selected at the discretion of the researcher.
For this reason, we advocate an approach to
understanding OA that examines theoretical
assumptions before interpreting data. Such
assumptions always exist, acknowledged or
not. Brought to the forefront, they serve to
anchor observations to bodies of knowledge
that have withstood repeated testing. Such
high-level bodies of general theory inform
middle- and lower-level theories that in turn
generate testable hypotheses (16, 28). The
explanatory relevance of broadly applicable
principles does not conflict with the obser-
vation that domestication of any plant or
animal is a particular, local, and historically
contingent process. If it did, evolutionary
theory could not be said to explain the di-
versity of life without implying that all evo-
lutionary lineages follow the same path.
To be clear, we applaud the attention being
paid to accurate reconstructions of the tra-
jectory and context of agricultural transitions
at regional and local scales. Detail-oriented
analysis of observations and data yield rich
historical accounts of OA (see, for exam-
ple, refs. 25 and 29-32). However, to the
extent that they purport to engage in ex-
planation, such accounts often rely on
inductions that are expected to stand on
the strength of available evidence alone.
Although we recognize that the prioritiza-
tion of data is often intentional and explicitly
stated (e.g., ref. 33), we disagree that it is
a good idea to abandon the iterative process
of hypothesis testing, revision, and retesting
that drives incremental advances in scientific
understanding.
Particularistic Explanations Lack a General
Theory for the Evolution of Human Behavior
Yet Rely on a General Theory of Evolution
for All Other Organisms. There is little dis-
agreement that change in the frequency of
attributes in populations of humans, animals
and plants under domestication is inherently
coevolutionary. Understanding this process
requires a general theory that links change in
one population to change in another. Cer-
tainly, humans possess a unique mode of
inheritance and an unusual degree of be-
havioral flexibility. However, cultural in-
heritance and the mechanics of human
learning that enable it are constrained (at
least, in the long run) by processes that
constrain the evolution of other organisms.
Far from being an obstacle to evolutionary
analysis, human uniqueness offers one of the
most important justifications for using it.
By not interpreting human behavior as
a product of natural selection, particularistic
approaches miss the opportunity to explore
commonalities in human behavior that en-
able comparative analysis of agricultural ori-
gins in starkly different contexts. Nothing
about an evolutionary perspective suggests
that natural selection generates a pre-
determined template for human behavior,
nor does it claim to explain everything that
humans do. Human social learning has its
own distinctive processes that influence pat-
terns of behavior at the population level.
However, human abilities (including the
capacity for communication, learning, and
choice—all components of cultural in-
heritance) are products of natural selection,
and human culture is a function of those
abilities (16, 34–36). Because agriculture has
been adopted (or inherited) by nearly all
human groups and because it was invented
separately by many, the process will be un-
derstood best by looking at change in the
history of human adaptation as a function of
attributes shared by all humans, rather than
looking at novel attributes unique to a few.
Because they lack a general theory for
human behavior, particularistic approaches
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rely on diverse and often conflicted principles
to account for the decision-making behavior
of human agents. In some cases, they retain
the rational-actor optimization logic of HBE
(e.g., that people will act in their own best
interest with regards to survival-related utility);
in other cases, they rely on creative or arbitrary
combinations of a “bounded rationality”
(sensu refs. 37 and 38) drawn opportunis-
tically from ethnographic or contemporary
observations; still others seem to gather
principles of behavior from social theory
(39, 40). Such principles are seldom made
explicit; in some cases they are revealed by
references to undefined or vaguely concep-
tualized properties or goals [e.g., “resource-
rich,” “intensification of resource manipula-
tion,” “rich array of plant and animal spe-
cies,” “enrichment,” “stable and sustainable,”
“stress,” etc. (23)]. Such terms betray em-
bedded assumptions about the ecological
situations that humans prefer and pre-
sumably strive for. Consistent theory that
illustrates how and why these organizing
principles emerge in the first place is
essential for explaining the outcomes of
diverse motivations in the distant past,
particularly when these outcomes are visible
today only in the aggregate records of ar-
chaeology and population biology.
Researchers who reject general theories of
human behavior and cultural evolution as
overly deterministic sometimes invoke human
agency as an alternative causal mechanism.
Agency is a contested term in archaeology,
and the OA literature seems to have adopted
one sense of it to the exclusion of others.
Advocates use the common reading of
agency (refs. 15 and 41, p. 67) to illustrate
how individual choice and creativity explain
cultural change, including the transition to
agriculture (ref. 29, p. 44). Although we ac-
knowledge the role of human creativity and
innovation in OA, we are not convinced that
appeals to agency have much explanatory
power, simply because they sidestep the
problem of identifying the evolutionary basis
of the beliefs and preferences that guide hu-
man action (42). In contrast, HBE generates
hypotheses about why humans behave the
way they do and evaluates whether or not
these hypotheses about agency explain the
material remains of those behaviors. We
agree that human agency is a critical com-
ponent of evolutionary change, but we do not
see it as having an equally important role in
the scientific explanation of change.
Another problem with explanation by
agency is that it often implies that decision
makers have complete information about the
long-term consequences of their actions. This
feat would require far more involved data
analysis than the simple arithmetic required
to find optimal solutions to foraging prob-
lems (for example) and is even farther re-
moved from the practical heuristics (e.g.,
rules of thumb, tacit or explicit learning, ra-
tional calculation, etc.) that people actually
use to make those decisions. By contrast,
simple agency in foraging models is one of
individual decision making, but does not
imply (and does not require) long-term
teleological self-determination.
The Evolutionary Approach Is a Robust,
Flexible, and Practical Avenue for an
Incrementally Better Understanding of
Human Behavior and Cultural Change
Whereas evolutionary biologists seldom have
to confront the question of human excep-
tionalism, the issue is a central one in an-
thropology and archaeology. The application
of evolutionary theory to human behavior
has been criticized for excessive adaptation-
ism, reductionism, positivism, and material-
ism (e.g., refs. 43 and 44). These criticisms
have been taken up by many advocates of
interpretive archaeology, who question the
exclusive claim of science to the production
of useful knowledge (many examples appear
in ref. 45; see also ref. 24).
Some archaeologists who do embrace
evolutionary concepts in their OA research
remain uncomfortable with their application
to human behavior. Particularly heavy criti-
cism has been leveled at evolutionary ecology
(EE), defined as the “study of evolution and
adaptive design in ecological context” (ref. 46,
p. 3), especially the subdiscipline of HBE and
its optimal foraging models. These critiques
target either the basic assumptions of EE
(many of which are shared by other evolu-
tionary approaches) or elements of HBE or
OFT specifically (14, 22, 23). Although the
objections are numerous, they commonly
revolve around the following themes: (i)
explanations based on evolution by natural
selection are “covering law” explanations
that fail to account for the particular his-
torical circumstances of their social and
biological contexts; (ii) simple models are
inappropriate for complex phenomena;
(iii) the use of multiple simplifying models
is compromised when one or more models
fail to explain or predict the phenomena at
hand; (iv) models do not explain human
subsistence (or any other) behavior; (v) ex-
planatory, predictive models deny human
agency and are therefore dehumanizing; and
(vi) some models do not account for envi-
ronmental change and are therefore in-
appropriate for historical or evolutionary
analysis. We find these critiques unwarranted
and explain our reasoning below.
The Study of Evolution Is a Historical
Science. Evolutionary theory is not covering
law science (ref. 23, p. 681). It is a scientific
approach to history (47) that views change as
both cause and consequence of the immedi-
ate and long-term fitness implications of
inherited and acquired variation. Although
focused on the processes of change, nothing
about these processes, or the analysis of them,
is deterministic, teleological, or scripted. The
context and consequences of one case might
be completely different from the next (i.e.,
both historical and particular), but the foun-
dations of evolutionary analysis are unifying.
At the same time, it is flexible enough to deal
with the hyper-variability of human behavior,
which, for a variety of evolutionarily sound
reasons, evolves and diversifies rapidly (48).
In part, this flexibility comes from the ap-
plication of a wide range of models that
isolate specific aspects of behavioral and
evolutionary phenomena.
Simple Models of Complex Phenomena
Are Useful Even When They Fail. Recent
reactions to the use of OFT’s simplifying
models in hunter–gatherer and OA research
(14, 49, 50) take their cue from older critiques
in biology and ecology (e.g., refs. 51 and 52)
but differ on the issue of culture. For many
social science scholars, models that isolate
specific aspects of individual behavior in a
ceteris paribus world (53) are impractical
because (i) the ceteris paribus world doesn’t
exist, and (ii) individuals perform in a
complex, indivisible milieu that can be un-
derstood only in its holistic totality. For
many, the practice of methodological iso-
lation and analytical simplification has
“reduced human actors to disemboweled
humans who no longer have cultural
anchors” (ref. 54, p. 59). They complain that
evolutionary models isolate individuals from
populations and remove both from the thing
that binds them, which is culture.
Reservations about heuristic models are
welcome (indeed these reservations and
the resulting critiques may lead to better
models); outright rejection of them is not.
Unfortunately, and in many cases, rejection
of simple, heuristic models is based on an
idealized (but often unstated and un-
supported) view of how the world works and
on the complaint that too many people take
the modeled predictions as fact, with or
without empirical backing (14). Such cri-
tiques mistakenly conclude that the optimi-
zation assumptions used heuristically in
many HBE models constitute a claim that
optimal resource use explains all transitions
to agriculture (ref. 23, p. 682).
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The use of simple models (like those used
in OFT) does not imply that the predictions
of the models must be true. All things being
equal (in the ceteris paribus world), the models
should explain the behavior of organisms
foraging optimally to maximize reproductive
success. In the absence of data, the modeled
predictions are simply that, and if the
assumptions are correct, the predictions
simply ought to be true. When data do exist
but do not fit the model, either all things are
not equal (e.g., the assumptions are in-
correct), the model is inappropriately ap-
plied (e.g., the scale or resolution of the
behaviors does not match those of the
resulting data and/or the currency of the
model is inappropriate), or the organism
simply doesn’t conform to expectation.
Observations of the final type can also be
productive by leading to further hypothe-
sis testing built on related versions of EE
developed specifically to explain the pro-
liferation and persistence of suboptimal or
maladaptive behavior (17, 55–58).
The criticism that HBE models sometimes
fail to yield accurate predictions when tested
misses the point that the exploration of the
model’s vulnerability can itself be a source of
insight. Models are productive means for
“eliminating problematic answers and iden-
tifying and pursuing more promising ones”
(ref. 59, p. 171). In other words, failure is an
option. For example, when empirical tests of
the diet breadth model (DBM) failed to show
a good fit of data to model predictions for
agricultural transitions in the eastern United
States, the findings led to a better grasp of the
variables and tradeoffs (such as travel and
processing costs) that most influenced sub-
sistence strategies (e.g., refs. 60 and 61).
Piperno and Pearsall (62) also discussed how
OFT models, whose predictions conformed
to Neotropical empirical data on the emer-
gence of food production, were unlikely
to address subsequent agricultural in-
tensification satisfactorily, which evoked
other explanations. Others (63–65) have in-
vestigated the failure of simple foraging
models such as the DBM to capture im-
portant influences on agricultural decision
making, such as yield variability and labor
investment. These studies counter claims
that applications of OFT demand idealistic
purism or seek perfection in model/data fit
(14, 50).
Simple, well-used models of OFT like the
DBM (66) outline the logic of individual,
time-sensitive decisions, and, because indi-
viduals make decisions in different contexts,
the model anticipates behavioral variation.
The extent of this variation in time and space
is exactly what we find interesting, and relev-
ant to OA research. Aggregate patterns of
individual behavior are what we see in the
archives of the past. Therefore, the study of
the past requires evaluation of models
against data aggregated over different scales.
The DBM is one model that makes this
procedure possible. It is not the only model,
and there is no reason to expect it to explain
all data on all scales of time or space. How-
ever, in combination with related models, it is
a very powerful analytical tool.
A Challenge to One Model Does Not
Negate the Others. One critique of the
evolutionary program is that it shifts arbi-
trarily between models that isolate and ad-
dress different aspects of phenomena staged
at different scales of time, space, or number
(e.g., ref. 67). The observation is fair, but the
critique is not. Indeed, what makes EE so
versatile is that it draws from a “family of
models” to address the tradeoffs between
generality, realism, and precision inherent to
any approach to scientific inquiry (68–70).
The important point here is that we draw on
models rooted in a unified body of theory,
even if some of the models fail to explain the
existing data, or if the models explain the
data on different scales or levels of analysis.
Models of EE Often Generate Accurate
Predictions of Human Subsistence Be-
havior, Including OA. As previously noted,
OFT is one class of models with a reasonable
purchase in the explanatory realm, and one
that has provided a number of insights for
biologists and archaeologists. A review of the
past few years of biological literature finds
persistent employment of OFT models, with
empirical data often showing good fits with
their predictions in a variety of organisms
(e.g., refs. 71–74). OFT applications in hu-
man research also continue apace with
valuable insights on varied topics (e.g., refs.
75–78).
A particularly important and well-studied
example of subsistence change associated
with OA and one that has been a focus of
OFT applications is the “broad spectrum
revolution” (BSR) (79). The BSR describes
the expansion of human diets and the in-
tensification of plant and animal exploita-
tion that preceded agricultural beginnings in
many parts of the world. Investigations of the
BSR with OFT typically use the diet breadth
model (DBM) and have shown a good fit of
model predictions with empirical data from
archaeological sites in southwest Asia, the
Neotropics, and elsewhere (e.g., refs. 6, 62,
and 80–87). Research shows that dietary
shifts from higher- to lower-ranked plant and
animal resources, or a more even dependence
on small-sized dietary items, occurred as
a result of climate- and/or human-driven
factors, depending on the region involved.
Examples include terminal Pleistocene fau-
nal extinctions and vegetational change
(Neotropics) and increasing human de-
mographic pressure leading to resource
depression (southwest Asia). It is impor-
tant to reiterate (88) that ethnographic
datasets on foraging efficiency from around
the world support the ranking of general
categories of resources such as small and
large game according to their energetic return
rates (net energy obtained per unit time
spent). Although exceptions occur, most
plant foods and small and medium-sized
mammals are ranked lower than most large
game, and nuts and seeds are often the low-
est-ranked of all (80, 88). It would be coun-
terproductive for investigations of cultural
developments through time, such as agricul-
tural origins, to ignore those associations.
The collective archaeological data clearly
underline how dietary diversification and
intensification of plant use by foragers and
incipient farmers probably occurred in an
environmental milieu of shifting energetic
return rates. Arguments that DBM pre-
dictions for the BSR are frequently invali-
dated by the archaeological data (14) are
difficult to reconcile with the results of these
studies. As a number of scholars have
pointed out, the DBM is particularly suited
for studying major directional changes in
subsistence through time because of its ability
to make robust, qualitative predictions of
prey choice and dietary diversity. Using the
model does not require that every past or
present resource ranking set be in perfect
order with respect to the general category of
resource, package size, and the energetic
return rates of individual items.
Ecological Models Accommodate Human
Agency. Rejection of models like the DBM
in favor of explanation by agency echoes
a long-standing debate in evolutionary bi-
ology over the levels of causation (89–93). In
behavioral science, ultimate explanations view
behavior as a product of natural selection
(cultural and biological) whereas proximate
explanations attempt to understand how
individuals identify challenges, make deci-
sions, and initiate action (this being the realm
of agency). The former have been caricatured
as evolutionary “why” questions whereas the
latter have been equated with questions of
“how.” Many see the conflation of these
issues as a general challenge to evolutionary
theory (93) whereas others recognize that both
are important to understanding the structure
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of biological, cultural, and socio-ecological
change (42, 92).
HBE models, specifically the contingency
models such as the DBM, seek ultimate
explanations by identifying optimal solutions
to immediate problems. They assume that
organisms possess an evolved general capac-
ity to achieve these optimal solutions, at least
on average. Although it is true that models
like the DBM rest heavily on ultimate rather
than proximate explanation, this trait is no
reason to reject them. Indeed, users of the
model regularly acknowledge that it is silent
about proximate causes while recognizing
that many such causes exist. Both proximate
and ultimate causes shape evolution, and the
study of evolution must be able to identify
where and when the feedbacks between
“hows” and “whys” are reciprocal (92). The
HBE modeling format makes this step pos-
sible by being agnostic about proximate
causes, and testing hypotheses premised on
ultimate causation. This agnosticism does not
deny human agency but notes that agency,
practice, and habitus (for example) are ulti-
mately constrained by natural selection, at
least over time. Because the models are not
absolute covering-law statements, they can
accommodate feedbacks between proximate
and ultimate causes when, for example, nat-
ural selection (the ultimate cause) shapes the
way people make decisions (the proximate
cause), and those decisions further shape the
environment of selection.
Whether or not the domestication of plants,
animals, people, or landscapes entails mor-
phological, genetic, or associational change, by
design (i.e., “agency”) or by accident, abruptly
or gradually, understanding the process on the
human side of things requires an archaeology
that tracks change in human behavior. Ar-
chaeological data typically say little about
individuals but speak volumes about individ-
uals in aggregate. HBE provides the theoretical
foundation for understanding aggregate pat-
terns as the product of individual decisions.
Indeed, archaeological data are best viewed as
the products of traits most common across
a population of individuals; change in the
spatial and temporal patterns of archaeolog-
ical data reflects change in the distribution or
frequency of traits within and among pop-
ulations, through space and time.
Ecological Models Accommodate Envi-
ronmental Change. Some critics of OFT
suggest that it assumes an unchanging envi-
ronment (refs. 14 and 50, p. 257). They argue
that OFT models do not account for change
in the environment of selection that creates
domestic plants and animals and suggest
that they should be discarded in favor of
explanations drawn from niche construction
theory (NCT) (94). NCT highlights the
multiple kinds of feedback that flow to the
niche constructor and to other populations
whose environments its niche-constructing
activity influences (e.g., ref. 95). In doing so,
NCT makes it possible to better characterize
the ecological context in which optimality
must be assessed. That hunter–gatherers did
(and do) modify landscapes and resources for
calculated gain is inarguable (96–98); how-
ever, the extent and scope of this practice
are a matter of considerable debate (49). In
the case of domestication and agriculture,
landscape modification has long been recog-
nized as an important phenomenon (99–
101). However, we do not agree with the
contention that OFT models cannot accom-
modate dynamic environments and argue
that EE is well-positioned to support and
complement NCT.
Although environmental stasis might be
necessary to some aspects of model building
(e.g., the contingency of the DBM assumes
a static prey ranking), the simple models of
foraging theory are equally applicable to dy-
namic environments (102–104). For exam-
ple, the decision contingency of the DBM
(66) is based on the marginal rate of return
established by two important inputs: en-
counter rate (a function of prey abundance)
and postencounter return rate (a function of
prey value offset by the costs of acquiring and
processing it). Data for the latter define the
ranking of different prey, which is fixed until
either the size (or total nutritional value) of
the prey changes, or the energetics of cap-
turing and processing it do. Thus, for each
decision contingency there might be a differ-
ent prey ranking, and, if so, the “optimal” diet
in that instance may be different from during
the previous instance. The standard logic of
the DBM is that lower-ranked prey enter the
diet as the abundance of higher-ranked prey
declines; increasing abundance of lower-
ranked prey has only a minimal effect on the
decision to include them in the diet (105,
106). However, environmental modification
may affect more than just absolute abun-
dance and rates of encounter: change in the
distribution of taxa also affects postencounter
return rates that, in turn, affect the ranking of
different prey taxa. Harvesting and replanting
can raise the density of plants within a patch,
which can alter the ranking of the resource
(by reducing the costs of collecting the seeds)
and boost its dietary importance (which may
have been constrained initially by scarcity)
(107). In other cases, selective, intensive har-
vests may reduce the body size of the average
individual prey, again affecting the prey
ranking and therefore the optimal decision.
EE offers a systematic way to evaluate the
motivations for niche-construction activities
such as landscape management and its in-
tensification. In fact, applications of behav-
ioral ecological models in archaeology often
highlight the active role of humans in shap-
ing their habitats (62, 80, 97, 108). Assertions
to the contrary (50) neglect a substantial
amount of literature on the subject. Critically,
HBE permits an evaluation of the overall
return rates associated with resource acqui-
sition, which must include the costs of
investing in land management as well as
the returns of a managed landscape. EE
(including HBE and OFT) can be useful
for understanding the evolution of land-
scape management practices and other
forms of niche construction and for eval-
uating the relationship between land, la-
bor, and resource productivity.
We see a problem with using NCT as
a “single unifying approach for integrating
consideration of human and non-human
modification of ecosystems” (ref. 50, p. 265)
because it does not systematically address
how or why humans alter their resource-
acquisition patterns. There is little doubt that
intensive human activity modifies ecosystems
in diverse ways that nonetheless follow a
limited set of pathways (50). However, a
more intriguing question is why altered
ecosystems engender or permit novel be-
havioral strategies in some cases but not
others. Indeed, if hunter–gatherer land-
scape modification (including intentional
enhancement of resource abundance) is a
common feature of hunter–gatherer adap-
tive systems, why do so few cases generate
the environment of selection that yields
domestic plants and animals? Clearly, more
is at work than the pervasiveness of niche
construction: insights from NCT require the
evolutionary logic of human decision mak-
ing in tandem with a tighter consideration
of the interactions between multiple taxa in
novel settings to explain the origins of ag-
riculture. Without a theory of organismal
behavior, such as HBE, the alternatives imply
either (i) that humans invented agriculture
and its long-term consequences knowingly
(as some advocates of human agency would
have us believe), or (ii) that agriculture
emerged almost randomly as a function of
dynamic feedbacks between genes, environ-
ment, and the interactions between them
(according to the strict version of NCT).
Integration of Evolutionary Frameworks
Evolutionary theory as applied to archaeo-
logical questions such as OA remains diverse,
as expected for a relatively new but maturing
field. However, the various approaches share
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a commitment to evolutionary explanation
even though they emphasize different pro-
cesses, questions, and types of causation. EE
(inclusive of HBE and OFT) (61, 64, 109),
niche construction theory (19, 26), and
models of cultural transmission and gene–
culture coevolution (19, 110–112) all have the
potential to link empirical findings to a well-
established body of knowledge, but they tar-
get different implications of selection. OFT
predicts how organisms might mobilize
evolved decision-making mechanisms to
maximize utility in the face of conflicting
needs; niche construction theory asks how
environmental engineering sets up pathways
of ecological inheritance that affect the fitness
of the organism and its descendants; cultural
transmission theory asks how patterns of
social learning peculiar to our species gener-
ate patterns of descent and divergence in
cultural lineages.
Debates over the relative utility of these
approaches have been helpful in distinguish-
ing between fundamental incommensur-
abilities and superficial differences, thereby
moving us closer to synthesis. We agree with
Bettinger and Richerson that “Darwinian
theory accommodates a virtually limitless
range of interesting, fruitful projects. It is
perhaps this diversity that causes us some-
times to forget the basic commonalities that
unite the Darwinian enterprise”(ref. 112, p.
222). To declare that any of these theoretical
perspectives is fatally flawed (14, 45) closes
the door on potentially productive alliances
among them.
For example, we believe that NCT can
continue to move forward by joining forces
with other evolutionary programs. Comple-
mentarity between NCT and EE has already
been illustrated in case studies of New World
hunter–gatherers and agriculturalists (108).
Broughton et al. (ref. 108, p. 371) note that
EE “focuses on how behavioral adjustments
to changing socio-ecological conditions cre-
ate novel selective pressures that in turn drive
other changes in morphology and behavior”
and therefore “draws on the same evolu-
tionary logic that underlies niche construc-
tion theory.” Others (e.g., ref. 113) illustrate
how NCT-based hypotheses can explain
technological change across the transition to
agriculture. O’Brien and Laland (19) make
a strong case that gene–culture coevolution
theory and NCT strengthen and support
explanations of adaptive complexes related to
agriculture, such as adult lactose tolerance
and persistence of sickle-cell disease.
Conclusions
We believe strongly that the most significant
archaeological contributions to our under-
standing of domestication will be those that
acknowledge that humans are subject to the
forces of evolution. We find little justification
for the argument that, of all species, only
Homo sapiens is capable of transcending
these forces. We also advocate the use of
theoretical frameworks that serve to link
testable hypotheses to ultimate explanations
for human behavior. However, we also wish
to make it clear that, in doing so, we are not
advocating any approach that ignores the
distinctiveness of cultural evolution or the
great behavioral plasticity that characterizes
human interactions with the natural world.
Nor are we in favor of glossing over historical
particulars in the interests of advancing
general theories of change.
Calls to purge OA research of HBE or
OFT fail to distinguish between levels of
theory and their respective epistemological
roles. In OA research, certain core elements
of Darwinian evolutionary theory (as ad-
vanced and amended by the neo-Darwinian
synthesis and, more recently, evolutionary
and ecological developmental biology) have
earned the status of basic assumptions. The
reality of evolution by natural selection is
such a core idea, arguably the most important
one for OA research. It unifies approaches
that use different analytic tools and methods
and target different kinds of questions.
The research programs that cluster under
the umbrella of evolutionary theory have
generated, and continue to generate, testable
hypotheses that contribute to our un-
derstanding of OA. Of these, HBE and OFT
have a longstanding record of productivity,
and, more recently, models of cultural in-
heritance have begun to show considerable
promise. Although there is no way of pre-
dicting which evolutionary perspectives will
prove most useful in the long run, one thing
is certain: a retreat from theory in favor of
particularism will ensure that none of them
achieve their full potential.
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